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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

of TMDLs falling under section 1313.
The court of appeals next focused on Longview Fibre Co. v.
Rasmussen. In Longview, the Ninth Circuit held it could not review
TMDLs because it lacked original jurisdiction. The Longview court
considered whether it could review TMDLs under the language of
section 1311, and determined that Congress' exclusion of section 1313
from the list of reviewable sections meant that Congress did not intend
for courts of appeals to originally review TMDL decisions. The
Long-view court also found that Congress drew distinctions between the
effluent limitations in section 1311 and section 1313 in other parts of
the CWA, thus indicating TMDLs could not constitute effluent
limitations under section 1311. Finally, the Longview court found the
listing of section 1312 also supported its argument that Congress did
not intend for appellate jurisdiction over reviews of TMDLs, because
1311 would subsume section 1312.
FOE encouraged the court to instead consider the Supreme Court
decision in Public Utility District No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
FOE argued that the Supreme Court
Department of Ecology.
interpretation in Public Utility District incorporated section 1313
effluent limitations into section 1311, making TMDL determinations
reviewable by a court of appeals. However, in this case, the court of
appeals found the short reference in Public Utility District could not
overcome both the plain language of the CWA and the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Longview. The court argued FOE ignored the context of
the incorporation statement. The Supreme Court originally based the
incorporation statement on legislative history, but the court of appeals
argued legislative history provided no explanation of incorporation in
this context, and was therefore irrelevant. Because of the paucity of
explanation in Public Utility District,the court found the plain language
of the statute and the decision in Longview to mean it possessed no
original jurisdiction to review the EPA's TMDL decision. Thus, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case.
JaredEllis

COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Norman v. United States, 56 Fed. C1. 255 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (holding (1)
Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over an illegal exaction
claim; and (2) Government's motion in limine improperly barred the
Normans from challenging validity of the wetlands redelineation that
effected a taking, insofar as it sought to prevent developer from
directly challenging the validity or authorization of the government's
actions).
Don Roger Norman and Roger William Norman (the "Normans")
filed a complaint against the United States Army Corps of Engineers
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("Corps") in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking
invalidation of a wetlands redelineation. The Normans alleged the
Corps affected a permanent taking of 193.11 acres by issuing a section
404 permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and claimed a taking
of the entitlement to develop residential units on their ranch property.
In the alternative, the Normans argued the Corps illegally exacted
approximately 220.85 acres of land at their ranch. The Corps then
filed a motion in limine to bar the Normans from challenging the
validity of the government action that affected a taking.
In December 1988, the Normans acquired a portion of the Double
Diamond Ranch ("Ranch") in Reno, Nevada to develop commercial
and industrial office space. Prior to the Normans' purchase of the
land a delineation team from the Corps, using the 1987 version of the
Corps Wetlands Delineation Manual ("1987 Manual"), concluded the
Ranch property contained 28 acres of jurisdictional wetlands. As a
result of heavy criticism by both public and private parties, in October
1990 the Corps informed the Normans that the 1988 wetlands
delineation of the Ranch was no longer valid. In April 1991, the Corps
then commenced a new delineation of the Ranch property. Applying
procedures detailed in the 1989 version of the Corps of Engineers
Wetlands Delineation Manual ("1989 Manual"), the Corps identified
230 acres ofjurisdictional wetlands on the Ranch property, as opposed
to the prior identified 28 acres.
In August 1991, before the Corps could relay the results of the
1991 redelineation to the Normans, Congress enacted the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992 ("Act"). The Act
forbade the use of funds to identify or delineate wetlands under the
1989 manual. Because the Corps had started but not completed the
process of delineating the Ranch pursuant to the 1989 Manual at the
time of the Act's passage, the Normans had the option to elect a new
delineation under the 1987 Manual. The Normans accordingly
informed the Corps that they did not want to request a redelineation
of the Ranch under the 1987 Manual. In August 1999, the Corps
issued a section 404 permit to the Normans. The permit authorized
disturbance, for purposes of development, on a total of 74.09 acres of
wetlands and .70 acres of other waters of the United States, 61.56 acres
of which were wetlands designated by the 1991 delineation.
Additionally, the permit required the Normans to dedicate
approximately 220 acres of land on the Ranch as a wetland and wildlife
habitat.
The Normans sued, alleging that as a result of the section 404
permit the United States took for public use approximately 193 acres
of the Normans' commercial property, and that the United States took
for public use the Normans' entitlement to build residential units. In
the alternative, the Normans claimed an illegal exaction, contending
that the section 404 permit, predicated on the 1991 redelineation of
the Ranch completed by the Corps in violation of the Act, required the
Normans to dedicate their land for public use in violation of the Act
and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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The court first addressed the illegal exaction claim, and found that
under illegal exaction jurisprudence the Normans could not seek
recovery for the Corps' redelineation of the wetlands as a violation of
the Act. Ruling it only possessed jurisdiction of an illegal exaction due
to a misrepresentation or misapplication of statutes, the court
determined that the Corps did not misapply the Act to the
redelineation of the Ranch even though the Act may have been
violated through expenditure of funds. Since the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the illegal exaction claim, the court
dismissed the complaint.
Next, the court addressed the United States' motion in limine to
both bar the Normans from challenging the validity of the Corps'
redelineation of the Ranch in the context of a regulatory takings
action and to prevent the Normans from introducing related evidence
at trial. The court noted that engaging in a factual inquiry of what
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment requires the
examination of three factors: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of
the government action.
Noting the complexity of the case, the inability of the court to
decide what facts are relevant in this case of first impression, and
having no set formula for determining when justice and fairness
require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, the court denied the Corps' motion
in part, except insofar as it sought to prevent the Normans from
challenging the validity or authorization of the government actions.
D.M. Shohet

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Allstate v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5456, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6180
(N.D. IMl. Apr. 10, 2003) (dismissing insurance company's subrogation
claim under the Clean Water Act for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
Allstate Insurance Company and various insurance carriers
("Allstate") sued the City of Chicago and Harza Environmental
Services (jointly "Chicago") alleging violations of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Allstate alleged that Chicago's faulty sewer system design

resulted in flooding and sewer discharge into basements and navigable
waters, and exceeded wastewater discharge allowed under the CWA.
Allstate maintained a subrogation claim of relief regarding the alleged
violations of the CWA, nuisance and trespass, based on property
damage sustained and insured's loss of use and enjoyment of the
ecosystems affected by the discharges. Chicago argued that Allstate

